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Security in Modern Business:
Security Assessment Model for Information Security Practices
Daniel W K Tse
Department of Information Systems
City University of Hong Kong
iswktse@cityu.edu.hk
Abstract
From my previous field research, I found that most of the organizations have very poor
security practices. Some organizations may be aware of the consequences of information
security breaches, but would rather take the risk. Some are not knowledgeable enough and
partly because they have very limited resources to allocate in areas that return no benefits.
Some of them may think that their business partners will help to protect their information. As
a result, this is a kind of “I don’t care about what you care about” practice. In other words,
natures of these loopholes have been investigated and explored. The next thing is to find
solutions to fill this security gap.
Building on the findings of previous research, this paper identifies the prescriptions
that will reduce business information vulnerability. I first review the current information
security models or frameworks, all of which have shortcomings, and then discuss ISO9000
and the Capability Maturity Model, which can solve some of the problems that arise from
business information vulnerability. To fill the solution gap, I finally develop a new security
assessment model. Due to space limitation, details of this assessment model development
processes will be discussed in my other research paper.
Keywords: Information security management, modern business, security assessment model,
CMM, ISO17799

1. Introduction
We are human beings who dislike the constraints imposed by inflexible security
practices in our job performance. Password management is so inflexible (Parker 1998) and
binding that without positive motivation to help users realize the inherent rewards of
information security, the situation will not change and will be exacerbated if penalties are
imposed on infringements. Computer security technologists have focused on the security of
computer systems rather than on the human aspect, and this continues to dominate
information security provision to the detriment of protecting information from abuses and
misuses. Moreover, if users do not have much knowledge and training in information
security, how can they protect the information assets of their organizations? This is actually
a matter of education. In other words, security is a management problem more than a
technical problem.
Another implication is the lack of public pressure such as an insistence on certification
in information security. Because there is no public pressure on businessmen to address
information security, they are usually concerned with more tangible aspects of their
organizations.
The final implication is the pace of technology. Computer technology has recently
taken such a great stride forward that most of the past information technology methodologies
and concepts are outdated. Hence, some practitioners cannot keep pace with the increasingly
changing technology.
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With these implications in mind, we can now discuss information security prescriptions
that are suitable to the modern business world.

2. Review of Current Information Security Models and Frameworks
Before I explore the possible criteria for a new information security model, I will
review the current information security models and frameworks. There are many such
models or frameworks, but most of them are the variations of the early examples. For
instance, the Australian AS/NZS4444 is an adaptation of BS7799. Thus, the foundation
models and frameworks are mentioned as follows.
2.1 Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)
This is also known as the Orange Book, and was developed by the U.S. Department of
Defense in 1983 (Available from http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/5200.28STD.html). Its basic security control objectives are security policy, accountability, and
assurance. Criticisms of it are that the whole blueprint is ‘more than enough’ or ‘over the
top’, but that it lacks important features, including an ‘automatic log out’, ‘password ageing’,
‘password format control’, ‘terminal dependent login’, ‘time of day/day of week access
control’, that is ‘lacks commercial awareness and tangible procedure’, that it does “not
explain how the security of a system should be evaluated’, that it ‘fails to keep pace with
technology’, and that it neglects the human aspect of information security. Parker (1998)
argued that this model does not distinguish between confidentiality and possession, and fails
to discuss the integrity and authenticity of information.
2.2 Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
This is also known as the Green Book, and was proposed by the U.K. Department of
Trade & Industry in 1990 (Available from http://www.bsi.de/zertifiz/itkrit/itsec.htm). Its
coverage is wider than that of TCSEC but still has many basic weaknesses. Criticisms of it
are that it ‘lacks commercial awareness and tangible procedures’, ‘does not explain how the
security of a system should be evaluated’, ‘fails to keep pace with technology”, and, like the
TCSEC model, that it neglects the human aspect of information security.
2.3 General CIA Model
Besides the TCSEC and ITSEC models, other models employ the basic nucleus of
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA). This approach has been criticized for
‘overlooking many viable vulnerabilities’, ‘missing the authenticity of information and the
misrepresentation of concerns’, being ‘too focused on destruction, disclosure, use, and
modification while missing withholding, locating, repudiating, and observing information’,
and the more important points of neglecting the ‘human aspect’ of information security and
‘certification’.
2.4 Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP)
This model was developed by a group of computer technology experts under the
auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Available from
http://www.oecd.org) in 1992. Its principles sound good but the model attracts much
criticism, such as it only addresses the modification, denial of use, and disclosure of
knowledge while it neither addresses the concept of information nor explains who would or
could cause losses. It is good at addressing education, awareness, and training measures but
says nothing about the need to motivate people to apply that education or awareness. It also
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does not address concerns about business, scientific engineering, and artistic information in
desks and filing cabinets, printed on paper, or spoken.
2.5 BS7799 Model
This is a code of practice that was developed by British Computer Society and several
European government agencies in 1995. Again, it was written by a group of computer
security technologists. It addresses the possession, authenticity, and utility of information,
but does not address the major threats to information. However, it is vague about concepts
such as auditing and reviewing, and known and possessed integrity and accuracy. Moreover,
though it has certification components, it offers no certification in the mature stages.
Nevertheless, it is the best of the models and is the most adopted by practitioners.
2.6 Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology Framework
The first version of this framework was developed by a group of European chapters of
the Information Systems Audit and Control Association in 1995. It provides more than 300detailed control objectives that can be categorized into three dimensions: IT domains,
Information criteria, and IT resources. It is mainly criticized for its confusing definitions of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and that it is still in its infancy. Although its third
version (Available from www.isaca.org/cobit/htm) includes a maturity model, it emphasizes
on IT governance and there is neither clearly defined key goal indicator nor process for each
of the five levels. Thus, it is just a conceptual framework only.
2.7 Summary
The following table summarises the above-mentioned models and frameworks.
Specifications
Strengths
Weaknesses
Extend of Adoption
important Jack of all trades
Coverage too Lack
TCSEC Security
too
little
much and too features and human with
policy,
aspect,
weak
in practical value
accountability, high level
confidentiality,
assurance
integrity
and
authenticity
Lack human aspect Jack of all trades
ITSEC Similar
to Coverage
too
little
commercial with
TCSEC
wider
than and
awareness, not explain practical value
TCSEC
how to evaluate, outdated technology
Lack human aspect, Good for teaching
CIA
Confidentiality Generic
weak in vulnerability, purpose only
, Integrity and enough
authenticity
and
Availability
repudiation,
no
certification
not
Good
Lack human aspect, Coverage
GASSP Industrial
nor
principles
not
addressing sufficient
accepted
concept
of complete as an
practices
information
nor assessment model
explaining who would
or could cause losses
BS7799 Possession,
Complete
Lack human aspect, High extend of
authenticity
coverage with vague about auditing adoption
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COBIT

and utility of certification
information
component
Highly
Detailed
structured with
control
maturity
objectives
concept

and improvement
Too conceptual or Good guidelines for
to
high level, difficult to businessmen
start or follow but
implement
not
good
for
assessment

3. Relevance to BS7799 and ISO9000
ISO9000 is primarily concerned with quality management, or what the organization
does to ensure that its products conform to its customer’s requirements or simply fit a
purpose. From its introduction in 1987 to the end of December 1999, 343643 ISO9000
certificates were awarded in 150 countries.
ISO9000 has been extremely successful worldwide. The main reason for this success is
that there is public pressure on suppliers to be accredited with certification such as that of
ISO9000. Being ISO9000 accredited or registered can bring a basic confidence to the buyers.
As the rationale of ISO9000 is a kind of total quality management (TQM)
(International Standards Organization, ‘ISO9001, Quality Systems – Model for Quality,
Assurance in Design/Development, Production, Installation, and Services’, 1987), achieving
culture change and changing management behavior are two critical success factors. Besides,
Tingey (1997) considered that ISO emphasizes the basic elements of quality management and
assesses with a very rigorous auditing model. A good information security model also
requires these factors that would improve the commonly committed practice of “I don’t care
what you care about”. Moreover, a majority of IT security problems stem from some sort of
accident, and many stem from a lack of understanding, bad software, lack of procedures and
working practices, inadequate auditing, and inadequate disaster recovery planning. In other
words, IT security needs both technical standards as well as quality standards wich is based
on ISO9000 philosophy.
Though the above discussion indicates that ISO9000 can be used as a framework to
build an information security model, it is not an exhaustive list of the mission critical
information security practices. Tingey (1997) discussed that while ISO conducts audits to a
specific set of requirements, it does not mandate a specific system. In contrast, BS7799,
which was the predecessor of ISO17799, contained an exhaustive list of information security
practices. Tingey (1997) argued that the assessment usually involves the idea of ensuring
that there are sufficient controls in place; thus, we should have a reference list of controls like
BS7799. Moreover, the worst feature of ISO9000 is that it includes only two levels, i.e. ‘ISO
certified’ or ‘not ISO certified’. Thus, it cannot help organizations in improving the
processes.
ISO17799 seems like it could be used as a valid information security model to govern
business information security. This is incorrect because BS7799, which was the predecessor
of ISO17799, does not include the concept of capability maturity and only has two states of
certification, i.e. certified or not. However, as ISO17799 cannot be effectively modified to
include maturity concepts, BS7799 should be used as the foundation on which to build a new
security model.

4. Relevance to Capability Maturity Model (CMM)
The
Software
Engineering
Institute
(SEI)
(Available
from
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmm) of Carnegie Mellon University is a research and development
center that is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense through the Office of the Under
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Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The SEI’s core purpose is
to help others to make measured improvements in their software engineering capabilities. Its
vision is “the right software, delivered defect free, on time and on cost, every time”. One of
its products is the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) (Humphrey 1989). While ISO9000 is
driven from outside the organization, generally via contractual agreement, CMM is driven
from within the organization, generally focused on continuous improvement for the sake of
staying competitive.

Figure 1 - Generic Capability Maturity Model
The CMM assist organizations in maturing their people, process, and technology assets
to improve long-term business performance by providing a 5-level frame of reference for the
reflection of an organization’s relative strengths and weaknesses (Paulk 1995). Each of these
levels indicates an increased capability that has key process areas/practices to predict the
results of using the organization’s current software process. To gain a higher level of
capability maturity we need experience and we need to learn from experience.
As the CMM’s rationale is a kind of continuous improvement process management, it
can be used to transfer security assurance to the development process to reduce experience
and lengthy post-development evaluation process. If we think about the capability maturity
levels as characterizing the degrees of awareness that the organization has about its security
practices, then each maturity level indicates a significant increase in the degree of conscious
effort to produce the awareness of security practices; the degree of conscious effort to
manage and control the effort to produce the awareness of security practices and the degree
of involvement from everyone in the organization in managing, controlling, and improving
these efforts. As the organization increases its awareness about security practices, it becomes
increasingly capable of monitoring and changing its behavior, which in turn affects its
capability maturity level. A good information security model also requires these features.
Some organizations lack knowledge of where they are and how they should go about
developing best practice: usually they go too far (jump the step) or they go too slow (and can
even return to a lower level). As a result, they waste many resources but still cannot head
toward best practice. Thus, the CMM can provide a systematic way of improving their
awareness from the initial level, to the repeatable, defined, managed, and finally optimized
levels.
Although there is a third-party extension of the CMM called the Systems Security
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), which describes the essential
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characteristics of an organization’s security engineering process, it is only a consultative
model that is not clear enough to lead practitioners, and it has no influence (as it does not
employ an auditing model like ISO9000) over those who deliberately neglect the awareness
of information security. Moreover, it lacks a complete assessment or appraisal mechanism to
determine the level of capability maturity to which an organization belongs. In contrast,
BS7799 has a very clear set of processes and objectives to be met since it can guide the
practitioners step by step to achieve.

5. Criteria for Future Information Security Assessment Models
As shown in the above review of various current information security models and
frameworks, BS7799 should be used as a baseline model in developing a security assessment
model. However, this model lacks the capability maturity concept and an influential
authoritative certification scheme. To cater for the capability maturity concept so that
practitioners know where they are and how they are proceeding, incorporating the CMM
concept into BS7799 is appropriate. We can classify various sections of BS7799 into each of
the CMM’s key process areas. To cater for the need to be authoritative, the ISO9000
approach can be used to certify organizations through auditing as being at a suitable level of
capability maturity so that business partners can recognize each other’s security practice
level. If a higher-level company wishes to deal with a lower-level company, it should have
enough alertness to bear the security risk of exchanging business information. Besides this, a
progressive organization can know its current information security situation and set goals to
move to a new level of maturity.
Thus, a combination of BS7799, ISO9000, and the CMM can form an effective new
information security maturity model.

6. Creation of a new Information Security Assessment Model
Fitting the BS7799 components into the CMM can create a new security assessment
model called ‘SAM’. This combination can enjoy the benefits of using the BS7799
authoritative document, which is assumed to represent all possible information security tasks,
while employing the state-of-art CMM improvement concept to indicate the level that is
attained by a particular organization or the space for future improvement.
Caputo (1998) compared software process improvement to choreography.
Choreography involves control of the body’s components, guiding one or more dancers
through certain steps and through changing rhythms while maintaining balance to create a
best performance for their audience. Likewise, software process improvement involves the
control of an organization, and directing individuals through certain activities and through
changing conditions while maintaining a balance to create the best services for their
customers. In other words, implementing the CMM is like learning dancing: both activities
have levels for the performers to achieve and target toward which they can improve. Before
the implementation, let us consider the components inside BS7799.
BS7799 is composed of ten sections, each of which has sub-sections. The ten sections
represent the ten domains of information security, and their sub-sections further describe the
domains by categorizing and listing tasks to be accomplished. These tasks that are very
much similar to the key process areas in the CMM; they are logically listed but the sequences
cannot show any increase of maturity level. The main difficulties in fitting these tasks into
the CMM are that the tasks in each domain have different maturity levels, and that the two
models do not have the same number of tasks in each level. In other words, the ten domains
are not of equal strength at various maturity levels.
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To fit these tasks into the CMM, let us investigate the criteria of each CMM level so
that appropriate BS7799 components can be fitted. In the CMM, key process areas are
actually the requirements for achieving that maturity level, and they specify the areas on
which the organization should focus to elevate its processes to that maturity level. Each key
process area specifies a group of activities, which are called key practices that can
collectively satisfy the goals of that key process area. A higher level can be attained if all of
the key process areas of lower levels have been attained. In other words, the key process
areas of lower level are subsets of those of higher levels. During the fitting, care must be
taken to ensure dependence among the tasks of IS7799 and adherence to the spirit of the
CMM.
At initial level (1), the processes are used on an ad hoc basis. There is no key process
area. All organizations that are using information technology can be regarded as at least at
level 1 of the ‘SAM’ model.
Repeatable level (2), applies to organizations in which project management practices
are well established even though organization-wide processes may not exist. Most of the key
process areas focus on project management. This level emphasizes consistency in and
control of the requirements, planning, tracking, and assurance of component separation.
At the defined level (3), the software processes for the organization have been
precisely defined and regularly followed. The organization may learn from different projects
and subsequently improve the processes to benefit future projects. Key process areas target
the institutionalization of processes and some additional processes for the engineering of
software. This level emphasizes organization-wide focus, training, inter-group coordination,
peer reviews, and integrated management.
At the managed level (4), quantitative understanding of the process capability makes it
possible to quantitatively predict and control the process performance on a project. Key
process areas revolve around quantitatively managing the process and projects. As there is
no quantitative treatment of information security, auditable and measurable components are
used as the key concepts in this maturity level.
At the optimizing level (5), the process improves continuously, with level 4 providing
the mechanisms to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of process enhancement
initiatives. This level emphasizes defect prevention, technology change management and
process change management.
Finally, the above results can be summarized to produce the following ‘SAM’
information security assessment model. Due to space limitation, the details of how this
model is derived will be mentioned in my other research paper.

“SAM” Information Security Assessment Model
Key Process Areas / Practices
1.

2.

Security Policy
 Information security policy
i.
Information security policy document
ii.
Review and evaluation
Security organization
 Information security infrastructure
i.
Management information security forum
ii.
Information security co-ordination
iii. Allocation of information security responsibilities
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Maturity Level
2
3
4
5
√
√

√
√
√

3.

4.

5.

Authorization process for information processing
facilities
v.
Specialist information security advice
vi. Co-operation between organizations
vii. Independent review of information security
 Security of third party access
i.
Identification of risks from third party access
ii.
Security requirements in third party contracts
 Outsourcing
i.
Security requirements in outsourcing contracts
Asset classification and control
 Accountability for assets
i.
Inventory of assets
 Information classification
i.
Classification guidelines
ii.
Information labeling and handling
Personnel security
 Security in job definition and resourcing
i.
Including security in job responsibilities
ii.
Personnel screening and policy
iii. Confidentiality agreements
iv. Terms and conditions of employment
 User training
i.
Information security education and training
 Responding to security incidents and malfunctions
i.
Reporting security incidents
ii.
Reporting security weaknesses
iii. Reporting software malfunctions
iv. Learning from incidents
v.
Disciplinary process
Physical and environmental security
 Secure areas
i.
Physical security perimeter
ii.
Physical entry controls
iii. Securing offices, rooms and facilities
iv. Working in secure areas
v.
Isolated delivery and loading areas
 Equipment security
i.
Equipment siting and protection
ii.
Power supplies
iii. Cabling security
iv. Equipment maintenance
v.
Security of equipment off-premises
vi. Secure disposal or re-use of equipment

√

iv.
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√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√



General controls
i.
Clear desk and clear screen policy
ii.
Removal of property
6. Communications and operations management
 Operational procedures and responsibilities
i.
Document operating procedures
ii.
Operational change control
iii. Incident management procedures
iv. Segregation of duties
v.
Separation of development and operational
facilities
vi. External facilities management
 System planning and acceptance
i.
Capacity planning
ii.
System acceptance
 Protection against malicious software
i.
Controls against malicious software
 Housekeeping
i.
Information back-up
ii.
Operator logs
iii. Fault logging
 Network management
i.
Network controls
 Media handling and security
i.
Management of removable computer media
ii.
Disposal of media
iii. Information handling procedures
iv. Security of system documentation
 Exchanges of information and software
i.
Information and software exchange agreements
ii.
Security of media in transit
iii. Electronic commerce security
iv. Security of electronic mail
v.
Security of electronic office systems
vi. Publicly available systems
vii. Other forms of information exchange
7. Access control
 Business requirement for access control
i.
Access control policy
 User access management
i.
User registration
ii.
Privilege management
iii. User password management
iv. Review of user access rights
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√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√



User responsibilities
i.
Password use
ii.
Unattended user equipment
 Network access control
i.
Policy on use of network services
ii.
Enforced path
iii. User authentication for external connections
iv. Node authentication
v.
Remote diagnostic port protection
vi. Segregation in networks
vii. Network connection control
viii. Network routing control
ix. Security of network services
 Operating system access control
i.
Automatic terminal identification
ii.
Terminal log-on procedures
iii. User identification and authentication
iv. Password management system
v.
Use of system utilities
vi. Duress alarm to safeguard users
vii. Terminal time-out
viii. Limitation of connection time
 Application access control
i.
Information access restriction
ii.
Sensitive system isolation
 Monitoring system access and use
i.
Event logging
ii.
Monitoring system use
iii. Clock synchronization
 Mobile computing and teleworking
i.
Mobile computing
ii.
Teleworking
8. System development and maintenance
 Security requirements of systems
i.
Security requirements analysis and specification
 Security in application systems
i.
Input data validation
ii.
Control of internal processing
iii. Message authentication
iv. Output data validation
 Cryptographic controls
i.
Policy on the use of cryptographic controls
ii.
Encryption
iii. Digital signatures
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√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

iv. Non-repudiation services
v.
Key management
 Security of system files
i.
Control of operational software
ii.
Protection of system test data
iii. Access control to program source library
 Security in development and support processes
i.
Change control procedures
ii.
Technical review of operating system changes
iii. Restrictions on changes to software packages
iv. Covert channels and Trojan code
v.
Outsourced software development
9. Business continuity management
 Aspects of business continuity management
i.
Business continuity management process
ii.
Business continuity and impact analysis
iii. Writing and implementing continuity plans
iv. Business continuity planning framework
v.
Testing, maintaining and re-assessing business
continuity plans
10. Compliance
 Compliance with legal requirements
i.
Identification of applicable legislation
ii.
Intellectual property rights
iii. Safeguarding of organizational records
iv. Data protection and privacy of personal
information
v.
Prevention of misuse of information processing
facilities
vi. Regulation of cryptographic controls
vii. Collection of evidence
 Reviews of security policy and technical compliance
i.
Compliance with security policy
ii.
Technical compliance checking
 System audit considerations
i.
System audit controls
ii.
Protection of system audit tools

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

7. Discussion
7.1 Applicability
Awareness of Business Partner’s Security Practices: The primary purpose of creating
this model is to provide guidelines to judge the maturity level of an organization’s
information security practices. Using CMM’s concept, a higher level implies that the
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organization has very good information security practices, and a lower level implies that the
organization does not recognize the importance of good information security practices. Once
this classification can be made, each organization will have sufficient information and
awareness of their business partners’ information security practices. This is useful because
the organizations can conduct some risk management exercises before dealing with new
partners or customers. The risk assessment tasks of this risk management can take the
partners’ information security maturity level into account and make correct decisions in
dealing with new partners or customers. Thus, when organization A (with a higher maturity
level) deals with organization B (with a lower maturity level), organization A should be
ready to remedy the contamination of data that could be caused by organization B’s worse
security practices. If organization B has no special core competencies or other political
factors, organization A should not deal with it, because any contamination of data or
computer threats would make organization A lose its competitive advantage or affect its
relations with other organizations of high maturity levels. As a result, the maturity level of
organization A may be downgraded if it continues to deal with lower-level maturity
organizations. Obviously, it is better for two organizations to have the same maturity level
before they deal the business. This would tend to push a lower-level maturity organization to
upgrade its maturity level to be able to deal with all organizations, as is the spirit of CMM.
In other words, having good information security practices would become a pre-requisite for
every organization. “I don’t care about what you care about” should no longer be a dominant
attitude. This is very similar to the effect of ISO9000: if an organization has good quality
management, it is perceived to have good quality products/services and other organizations
favor those products/services (The ISO Survey of ISO9000 and ISO14000 Certificates’,
Ninth Cycle, International Organization for Standardization). The difference is that the SAM
model has many levels while ISO9000 has only one level.
Yardstick for Security Practices Improvement: The model also can serve as a yardstick
by which organizations can measure their improvement in information security practices. As
mentioned in Previous research, some organizations are not knowledgeable enough or do not
have the proper concept of how information security practices can be performed more
effectively. Even if they want to improve they do not know how to proceed. With this
model, however, if an organization wishes to improve its information security practices, then
it can try to fulfill all key process areas of the targeted level and then proceed to the next
maturity level. During this exercise, the learner can use the guidelines from the model to
implement the desired security maturity level. This is very similar to the functions of the
CMM: an organization can upgrade its software improvement status by implementing each
milestone’s key process areas. Thus, the ‘SAM’ model can have educational applications in
business organizations.
7.2 Limitation of the model
Certification: For ISO9000 certification, a lead assessor needs to check whether there is
non-compliance with the organization’s quality management standards.
After the
certification, the organization needs internal auditors to maintain the standards. As ISO9000
is a quality management standard, there is no need to invest in any fixed assets, and the only
investment is in initial certification costs and internal auditor salaries. For the ‘SAM’ model,
because it is similar to the CMM, continuous improvement is needed to maintain the maturity
level or to enhance security practices to jump to a higher level. Usually, to fulfill the
requirements of some key process areas, organizations would need to invest in expensive
hardware and software. Hence, in addition to the certification costs, they would need to
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invest in continuous improvement costs and substantial fixed assets. Thus, it is a relatively
more expensive game compared to ISO9000.
Assessment Method: The CMM uses CMM-based appraisal for internal process
improvement (CBA-IPI) (Software Engineering Institute 1996). An assessment team that is
led by an SEI-authorized lead assessor performs the assessment. During the assessment, the
team members collect information about the software process of the organization via maturity
questionnaires, documentation, and interviews (Humphrey 1989). In contrast, the SAM
model is related to information security, and it would be relatively difficult to assess whether
the target organization had fulfilled the requirement or not. Thus, the assessment would need
several certified experts inside the team, and it would not be easy to find so many experts:
besides having passed the required examinations, they would have to be very experienced in
related fields, preferably in similar industries.
Continuous Auditing: As security technology has taken a great stride forward in the
past few years, it is easy to obtain security protection devices and have methods updated.
Hence, continuous auditing had to be conducted like financial auditing, which has to be done
one to four times a year.

8. Conclusion
With the abovementioned criteria and the creation of a new information security
maturity model, we can move to more perfect business information security. One thing that
cannot be controlled is the new tricks that are being played by hackers who would like to take
advantage of the design loopholes of the state-of-the-art Internet technology (Parker 1998).
As the initial purpose of Internet was for academic research information exchange, this
vulnerability is partly attributable to the design weakness of Internet protocol version 4
(ipv4). This is because the current Internet was created for APARNET project that was
strictly controlled under Acceptable Use Policies (Miller 1999). Hopefully with the new ipv6
(which provides more Internet addresses and better security control like Source Demand
Routing Protocol, Security Association Bundle, Authentication Header, Encapsulating
Security Payload, etc.) (Miller 1999) and the refined security maturity model, most security
problems can be controlled. Last but not least, we have to be well equipped in a Faster
Learning Organization world so that most new security problems can be prevented, detected
or corrected. In fact, Dr. W. Edwards Deming had mentioned that we should “End the
practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag …”.
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